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ABSTRACT 
DNS64 and NAT64 IPv6 transition mechanisms are ex-
pected to play an important role in the near future to solve 
the problem that some of the new clients will not be able to 
get public IPv4 addresses and thus having only IPv6 ad-
dresses they still should be able to reach servers that have 
only IPv4 addresses. In our earlier experiments, the TOTD 
DNS64 implementation showed significantly better aver-
age performance than BIND, however TOTD was not sta-
ble, therefore now it was carefully tested to find the reason 
for its experienced strange behavior. Besides the detailed 
description of the testing method, the bug and the correc-
tion, a security vulnerability is disclosed and a patch is 
provided. The performance and the stability of the modi-
fied versions of TOTD are analyzed and compared to that 
of the original TOTD and BIND.  
Keywords: IPv6 deployment, IPv6 transition solutions, 
performance analysis, DNS64, TOTD, security, cache poi-
soning attack, random permutation 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The depletion of the global IPv4 Address Pool1 will be a 
driving force for the deployment of IPv6 in the forthcom-
ing years. The internet service providers (ISPs) can still 
supply the relatively small number of new Internet servers 
with IPv4 addresses from their own pool but the huge 
number of new clients can get IPv6 addresses only. How-
ever, the vast majority of the Internet sites still uses IPv4 
only. Thus from the many issues of the co-existence of 
IPv4 and IPv6, the communication of an IPv6 only client 
with an IPv4 only server is the first practical task to solve 
in the upcoming phase of the IPv6 deployment. The au-
thors believe that DNS64 [1] and NAT64 [2] are the best 
available techniques that make it possible for an IPv6 only 
client to communicate with an IPv4 only server. (The oper-
ation of DNS64 and NAT64 will be introduced in section 
2.) There are a number of implementations for both DNS64 
and NAT64. When a network operator decides to support 
DNS64 and NAT64, it can be a difficult task to choose the 
right implementations because there can be security, relia-
bility and performance issues. Several papers were pub-
lished in the topic of performance analysis of different 
DNS64 and NAT64 implementations. We have given a 
short survey of them in our previous paper about the per-
formance analysis and comparison of different DNS64 
implementations for Linux, OpenBSD and FreeBSD [3]. 
There we have pointed out that the average performance of 
TOTD was better than that of BIND but TOTD was not 
stable. We also concluded that TOTD deserves a thorough 
code review and a bugfix. We give an account of this work 
and its results in this paper. 
                                                                
1IANA delegated the last five “/8” IPv4 address blocks to the five 
Regional Internet Registries in 2011 [4], of which APNIC has 
already depleted its IPv4 address pool in 2011 and RIPE NCC did 
so in 2012 [5]. It means that APNIC and RIPE NCC must use a 
more strict allocation policy for their very last /8 block. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: first, 
the operation of the DNS64+NAT64 solution is described, 
second, TOTD is introduced, third, our way of debugging 
is presented including the description of the test network 
and the testing method and also the way the bug was found 
and eliminated, fourth, our modification for security en-
hancement is detailed, fifth, the performance and stability 
of the following four DNS64 implementations are evaluat-
ed: original TOTD, TOTD with bugfix, TOTD with bugfix 
plus security enhancement and BIND as a forwarder, and 
finally, our conclusions are given. 
2. THE OPERATION OF DNS64 AND NAT64 
To enable an IPv6 only client to connect to an IPv4 only 
server, one can use a DNS64 server and a NAT64 gateway. 
The DNS64 server should be set as the DNS server of the 
IPv6 only client. When the IPv6 only client tries to connect 
to any server, it sends a recursive query to the DNS64 serv-
er to find the IPv6 address of the given server. The DNS64 
server uses the normal DNS system to find out the IPv6 
address of the server. 
 If the answer of the DNS system contains an IPv6 
address then the DNS64 server simply returns the 
IPv6 address as its answer to the recursive query. 
 If the answer of the DNS system contains no IPv6 
address then the DNS64 server finds the IPv4 address 
(using the normal DNS system) and it constructs and 
returns a special IPv6 address called IPv4-Embedded 
IPv6 Address [6] containing the IPv4 address of the 
given server in the last 32 bits. In the first 96 bits, it 
may contain the NAT64 Well-known Prefix or a net-
work specific prefix from the network of the client. 
The route towards the network with the given IPv6 prefix 
should be set in the IPv6 only client (and in all of the rout-
ers along the route from the client to the NAT64 gateway) 
so that the packets go through the NAT64 gateway. 
The IPv6 only client uses the received IPv6 address to 
communicate with the desired (IPv4 only) server. The traf-
fic between the IPv6 only client and the IPv4 only server 
travels through the NAT64 gateway in both directions. The 
NAT64 gateway makes their communication possible by 
constructing and forwarding the appropriate version IP 
packets. For constructing IPv4 packets from IPv6 packets, 
the NAT64 gateway takes the IPv4 address of the server 
from the last 32 bits of the destination IPv6 address, which 
is actually an IPv4 embedded IPv6 address. In the opposite 
direction, the NAT64 gateway is able to determine the IPv4 
address of the client by using stateful NAT. 
For a more detailed but still easy to follow introduction, see 
[7] and for the most accurate and detailed information, see 
the relating RFCs: [1] and [2]. 
3. TOTD IN A NUTSHELL 
TOTD is a lightweight DNS64 implementation that was 
written by Feike W. Dillema as a part of the 6net project 
[8]. TOTD is available in source code from GitHub [9]. 
Section 5.3.7 of [8] writes that: 
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“The ‘Trick or Treat’ DNS-ALG called ‘totd’ is a light-
weight DNS proxy (not a full DNS server); it does not re-
cursively resolve queries itself. It is lightweight in that it 
consists of less than 5000 lines of C code. […] The ‘totd’ 
DNS-ALG is a proxy that forwards queries to one or more 
real nameservers that will recursively resolve queries. Such 
nameservers are called forwarders in totd terminology. If 
there are multiple forwarders specified, it will try them in 
the order listed. As a proxy, totd sits between client resolv-
ers and real forwarder nameservers and as such receives 
requests from clients which totd normally forwards to a 
real nameserver to resolve. When it subsequently receives 
a response from the nameserver it simply forwards it back 
to the client. […] If the nameserver that totd forwards the 
AAAA query to, does not return an IPv6 address for the 
AAAA query, totd will make a second query but this time 
for an A record of the hostname of the original query. The 
resulting IPv4 address is then used to construct a fake IPv6 
address, by replacing the lower 32 bits of the specified 
prefix with this IPv4 address. The resulting IPv6 address is 
sent as response to the original AAAA record query.” 
As for its licence, different parts of the code has slightly 
different licences but all licenses are of BSD style except 
for the optional built in tiny web server called SWILL, 
which has a GPL 2.1 licence.  
Due to the free software [10] also called open source [11] 
nature of TOTD, it was possible for us to look into the 
source code and also to add some more lines that enrich the 
debug info sent to syslog. 
4. DEBUGGING TOTD 
During our measurement for our previous paper [3], TOTD 
1.5 was tested in high load situations. TOTD occasionally 
stopped responding for about a minute and continued the 
operation afterwards. It produced similar behavior under all 
the three operating systems (Linux, OpenBSD and Free-
BSD). 
Before starting our work, we contacted the author of 
TOTD, who was very helpful and gave us advices but he 
did not have enough free time to set up a testbed and debug 
the software himself. Thus we did so. We used nearly the 
same test network as in paper [3] with the addition of the 
parts necessary for monitoring the traffic of the DNS64 
server (and the CPU and memory parameters of the client 
computers were somewhat different) and the description is 
taken from there, too. 
The Structure and Operation of the Test Network 
The test network was set up in the Infocommunications 
Laboratory of the Department of Telecommunications, 
Széchenyi István University. The topology of the network 
is shown in Fig. 1. The central element of the test network 
is the DNS64 server. For the measurements, we needed a 
namespace that: 
 can be described systematically 
 can be resolved to IPv4 only 
 can be resolved without delay 
The 10-{0..10}-{0..255}-{0..255}.zonat.tilb.sze.hu name 
space was used for this purpose. This namespace was 
mapped to the 10.0.0.0 – 10.10.255.255 IPv4 addresses by 
the teacherb authoritative name server. 
The tested TOTD DNS64 server program running on the 
Intel PIII test computer mapped these IPv4 addresses to the 
IPv6 address range: 2001:738:2c01:8001:ffff::0a00:0000 – 
2001:738:2c01:8001:ffff::0a0a:ffff. 
The DELL IPv6 only workstations at the bottom of the 
figure played the role of the clients for the DNS64 meas-
urements.  
Dell Precision 490
TL-SG5426
1000Base-TX switch
client1010x Dell Precision 490 
192.168.100.105/24
192.168.100.101/24
2001:738:2c01:8001::1/64
2001:738:2c01:8001::111/64 2001:738:2c01:8001::118/64
Intel PIII 800MHz
client1
. . .
DNS64 
server
client computers 
for all the tests
RB2011UAS-2HnD-IN with
port mirroring enabled
traffic monitoring
station
authoritative DNS server
teacherb.tilb.sze.hu
 
Figure 1.  Topology of the DNS64 test network. 
The switch between the PIII test computer executing 
TOTD and the teacherb authoritative name server was 
added to mirror the traffic to the monitoring station. 
The Configuration of the Computers 
A test computer with special configuration was put together 
for the purpose of the DNS64 server in order that the cli-
ents will be able to produce high enough load for overload-
ing it. The CPU and memory parameters were chosen to be 
as little as possible from our available hardware base in 
order to be able to create an overload situation with a finite 
number of clients, and only the network cards were chosen 
to be fast enough. The configuration of the test computer 
was: Intel D815EE2U motherboard, 800MHz Intel Pentium 
III (Coppermine) processor, 128MB, 100MHz SDRAM, 
Two 3Com 3c940 Gigabit Ethernet NICs. For the 10 client 
computers and for the IPv4 DNS server, standard DELL 
Precision Workstation 490 computers were used. 
Debian Squeeze 6.0.3 GNU/Linux operating system was 
installed on all the computers with the exception of the 
authoritative DNS server (teacherb.tilb.sze.hu), which 
had Debian Wheezy 7.1 GNU/Linux. All the computers 
had 64 bit operating systems with the exception of the PIII 
test computer that had a 32 bit one. 
IPv4 DNS Server Settings 
The DNS server was a standard DELL Linux workstation 
using the 192.168.100.105 IP address and the symbolic 
name teacherb.tilb.sze.hu. BIND was used for authori-
tative name server purposes in all the DNS64 experiments. 
The version of BIND was 9.8.4-rpz2+rl005.12-P1 as this 
one can be found in the Debian Wheezy distribution. 
The 10.0.0.0/16-10.10.0.0/16 IP address range was regis-
tered into the zonat.tilb.sze.hu zone with the appropri-
ate symbolic names. 
DNS64 Server Settings 
The network interfaces of the freshly installed Debian 
Squeeze Linux operating system on the Pentium III com-
puter were set according to Fig. 1. 
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In order to facilitate the IPv6 SLAAC (Stateless Address 
Autoconfiguration) of the clients, radvd (Router Advertise-
ment Daemon) was installed on the test computer. 
As TOTD is just a DNS forwarder and not a DNS recursor 
it was set to forward the queries to the BIND running on 
the teacherb computer. 
The content of the /etc/totd.conf file was set as follows:  
forwarder 192.168.100.105 port 53 
prefix 2001:738:2c01:8001:ffff:: 
retry 300 
Client Settings 
Debian Squeeze was installed on the DELL computers 
used for client purposes, too. On these computers, the 
DNS64 server was set as the name server in the following 
way: 
echo "nameserver 2001:738:2c01:8001::1" > \ 
      /etc/resolv.conf 
DNS64 Performance Measurements 
The CPU and memory consumption of the DNS64 server 
was measured in the function of the number of requests 
served. The measure of the load was set by starting test 
scripts on different number of client computers (1-10). In 
order to avoid the overlapping of the namespaces of the 
client requests (to eliminate the effect of the DNS caching), 
the requests from the number i client used target addresses 
from the 10.$i.0.0/16 network. In this way, every client 
could request 216 different address resolutions. For the 
appropriate measurement of the execution time, 256 exper-
iments were done and in every single experiment, 256 ad-
dress resolutions were performed using the standard host 
Linux command. The execution time of the experiments 
was measured by the GNU time command. (Note that this 
command is different from the time command of the bash 
shell.)  
The clients used the following script to execute the 256 
experiments: 
#!/bin/bash 
i=`cat /etc/hostname|grep -o .$` 
rm dns64-$i.txt 
do 
    for b in {0..255} 
    do 
        /usr/bin/time -f "%E" -o dns64-$i.txt \ 
           –a ./dns-st-c.sh $i $b 
    done 
done 
The synchronized start of the client scripts was done by 
using the “Send Input to All Sessions” function of the ter-
minal program of KDE (called Konsole). 
The dns-st-c.sh script (taking two parameters) was re-
sponsible for executing a single experiment with the resolu-
tion of 256 symbolic names: 
#!/bin/bash 
for c in {0..252..4} # that is 64 iterations 
do 
    host –t AAAA 10-$1-$2-$c.zonat.tilb.sze.hu & 
    host –t AAAA \ 
        10-$1-$2-$((c+1)).zonat.tilb.sze.hu & 
    host –t AAAA \ 
        10-$1-$2-$((c+2)).zonat.tilb.sze.hu & 
    host –t AAAA \ 
        10-$1-$2-$((c+3)).zonat.tilb.sze.hu 
done 
In every iteration of the for cycle, four host commands 
were started, from which the first three were started asyn-
chronously (“in the background”) that is, the four com-
mands were running in (quasi) parallel; and the core of the 
cycle was executed 64 times, so altogether 256 host com-
mands were executed. (The client computers had two dual 
core CPUs that is why four commands were executed in 
parallel to generate higher load.) 
In the series of measurements, the number of clients was 
increased from one to ten and the time of the DNS resolu-
tion was measured. The CPU and memory utilization were 
also measured on the test computer running DNS64. The 
following command line was used: 
nice -n -10 dstat -t -T -c -m -n -N eth1,eth2 \ 
  -i -I 21,22 -p --unix --output load.csv 
Experiments and Observations 
First, we expected to face with some resource exhaustion 
problem thus we performed several runs of the experi-
ments. We checked that the teacherb authoritative name 
server was always responsive and sometimes TOTD 
stopped responding. However we could not find any regu-
larity in its behavior. 
When we specified two forwarders, we found that TOTD 
stopped responding only for a few seconds (instead of a 
minute or so) and it did so if the same forwarder was speci-
fied twice. 
Thinking of resource exhaustion, various limits were raised 
as follows: 
echo "512000">/proc/sys/net/core/rmem_max 
echo "512000">/proc/sys/net/core/wmem_max 
echo "512000">/proc/sys/net/core/rmem_default 
echo "512000">/proc/sys/net/core/wmem_default 
echo "512000 800000 1000000" \ 
    > /proc/sys/net/ipv4/udp_mem 
echo "65536">/proc/sys/net/ipv4/udp_rmem_min 
echo "65536">/proc/sys/net/ipv4/udp_wmem_min 
echo "128000" \ 
    > /proc/sys/net/core/netdev_max_backlog 
We also checked the number of open sockets (still thinking 
of resource exhaustion) but this was also not the problem. 
Using the command line below, we monitored everything 
that seemed to be reasonable: 
dstat -t -c -m -l -i -p -d -g -r -s -y --aio \ 
  --fs --ipc --lock --socket --tcp --udp \ 
  --unix --vm -n --unix --output test.csv 
We still did not find the reason of the strange “stopping” 
phenomenon, but having more and more experiences with 
TOTD, we felt that sometimes the DNS messages “just 
disappear” probably between the PIII test computer and the 
teacherb authoritative DNS server. Therefore, we decided 
to trace them very accurately. The switch between the PIII 
test computer and the authoritative DNS server was set to 
mirror the traffic to the monitoring station, where it was 
captured and recorded by tshark. We also added some 
more detailed logging of the important events (e.g. the 
arrival of the clients’ requests, the sending of the query to 
the authoritative name server and the arrival of its answer, 
etc.) to the source code of TOTD with nanosecond accura-
cy timestamps using the clock_gettime() C library func-
tion and the clocks of all the computers (the clients, the PIII 
test computer, teacherb and the monitoring station) were 
synchronized by NTP. 
In TOTD, we also decoded and logged the content of the 
DNS messages. This led us finally to the bug. Both DNS 
queries and responses begin by a 16 bit Transaction ID 
field set by the client and returned by the server. It lets the 
client match responses to requests. (See page 521 of [12].) 
As TOTD acts as a proxy, after receiving a query from a 
client it must behave as a client itself: it has to send a query 
to the DNS server that resolves recursive queries (called 
forwarder in the TOTD terminology).  TOTD must gener-
ate a transaction ID for the query. We have checked the C 
code for transaction ID generation in file ne_mesg.c. It was 
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done by a function named mesg_id() containing a static 
variable “id”: 
uint16_t mesg_id (void) { 
    static uint16_t id = 0; 
 
    if (!id) { 
        srandom (time (NULL)); 
        id = random (); 
    } 
    id++; 
 
    if (T.debug > 4) 
        syslog (LOG_DEBUG,"mesg_id() = %d",id); 
    return id; 
} 
The intention of the programmer seems to be clear: the 
value of the static variable is chosen randomly at the time 
of the first execution of the function and it is incremented 
by one at any later execution.  
However the actual behavior of the C code above is slightly 
different. When the value of id is 0xffff and it is incre-
mented then its value will be 0 and it is returned normally 
but at the next execution of the function the value of id 
will not be incremented to 1 rather it will be randomized 
again. Its value may be close to 0xffff with a small but 
positive probability. It means that the transaction ID of a 
new query may be equal to that of another recently sent 
query that is still waiting for the response. And it will cause 
problem when matching the responses to the queries. We 
have provided a quick bugfix by checking if the value of id 
became 0 and if it was so then promptly increasing it to 1 
in order to avoid the hazardous re-randomization: 
uint16_t mesg_id (void) { 
    static uint16_t id = 0; 
 
    if (!id) { 
        srandom (time (NULL)); 
        id = random (); 
    } 
    if ( !++id ) ++id; /*correction for id==0*/ 
 
    if (T.debug > 4) 
        syslog (LOG_DEBUG,"mesg_id() = %d",id); 
    return id; 
} 
After this modification, TOTD remained responsive even 
during a whole night testing. 
5. OUR SECURITY ENHANCEMENT FOR TOTD 
The Problem of Sequential Transaction IDs 
TOTD uses sequential transaction IDs, which are trivial to 
predict thus TOTD is vulnerable to cache poisoning using 
the transaction ID prediction attack. (The attacker per-
suades the victim DNS server to send a query for a given 
domain name and sends a response before the response of 
the authoritative name server by predicting the transaction 
ID and the victim DNS server will accept its answer, see 
section 4 of [13] for more details.) This is a serious security 
threat for all the DNS servers. The most widely used BIND 
[14] used also sequential transaction IDs prior to version 
8.2, pseudorandom transaction IDs were introduced in v8.2 
and further enhancements were made in v9, but it still has 
certain vulnerabilities according to [15]. 
Our Solution 
As for TOTD, we also chose the randomization of the 
transaction IDs. However, the naive use of individually 
generated random IDs would require keeping a record of 
them if they are still in use, which would make necessary 
the modification of the source code of TOTD at multiple 
places (e.g. to register them when a query is made and to 
delete them when an answer is received or the time-out 
value expired). Therefore, the method of pre-generated 
random permutations was chosen to be able to keep the 
modifications within a single file. Two further considera-
tions were made: 
 Using up all the 65536 elements of a random permuta-
tion would result in predictability when we are ap-
proaching to the exhaustion of the pool. 
 The lastly used elements of a given permutation may 
still be in use when some of them may appear between 
the first elements of a new permutation (resulting in 
the same bug that was fixed recently). 
Therefore, our solution uses two alternating pools for the 
transaction IDs, 0-0x7fff and 0x8000-0xffff and only the 
first half of the elements of the permutations are used as 
transaction IDs. This design gives a reasonable security 
enhancement over the original situation for the price of a 
small amount of programming work (actually two func-
tions in a single source file) and also a little waste of CPU 
power (50% of the elements of every permutation are not 
used). 
Our Implementation 
For preparing random permutation, the so-called “inside 
out” version of [16] was used. While the original version 
makes a random shuffle of the elements of an array in place 
and thus it requires the pre-initialization of the array, the 
modified version does both in a single cycle. The com-
plexities of both the original and the modified algorithm 
are O(N) where N denotes the size of the array, but the 
“inside out” version spares the work of the initialization 
and the exchange of the elements. Our commented C code 
can be seen in Fig. 2. Comments and recommendations for 
further improvements are especially welcome! 
6. PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENTS AND 
COMPARISON 
Even though the performance measurement results of the 
original TOTD and BIND can be found in [3] the meas-
urements were repeated for the following reasons: 
 Our previous paper is not open access therefore some 
readers of this paper may not have access to the re-
sults provided in that. 
 The configuration of the client computers were slight-
ly changed, which made the new results incomparable 
(or at least not fully comparable) with the old ones. 
 The old measurement script did not use the -t AAAA 
option of the host command, thus then some other 
identifiers (e.g. MX records) were also requested but 
now we wanted to focus solely on the performance 
providing the AAAA records. 
The measurements were taken the same way as they were 
done for bug hunting but the monitoring elements of the 
test network were removed. See the appropriate subsections 
of section 4 for the details. As now BIND was also includ-
ed as DNS64 server, now we give its settings before the 
results of the different tested implementations. 
The Set up of the BIND DNS64 Server 
BIND version 9.9.1-P1 was compiled from source. The 
2001:738:2c01:8001:ffff::/96 (network specific) prefix was 
set to BIND for the DNS64 function using the dns64 op-
tion in the file /etc/bind/named.conf.options. 
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#define ARRAY_SIZE 0x8000 /* Size of the static array storing permutations */ 
#define NUM_USE 0x4000 /* Number of elements used up from the array of permutations */ 
#define LOW_START 0x0000 /* Starting value of the lower range */ 
#define HIGH_START 0x8000 /* Starting value of the higher range */ 
 
static uint16_t permutation[ARRAY_SIZE]; /* The static array for storing random permutations */ 
 
/* Prepare a random pemutation of the integers [start, start+ARRAY_SIZE-1] into the static array */ 
/* Algorithm: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fisher%E2%80%93Yates_shuffle#The_.22inside-out.22_algorithm*/ 
void make_random_permutation(int start) { 
        int i,j; 
 
        permutation[0]=start;  
        for (i=1; i<ARRAY_SIZE; i++) { 
                j=random()*(double)(i+1)/RAND_MAX; /* random number from the range [0, i] */ 
                if ( j != i ) 
                        permutation[i]=permutation[j]; 
                permutation[j]=start+i; 
        } 
} 
 
/* Provide hard to predict unique random DNS Transaction IDs */ 
/* by using random permutations and alternating ranges */ 
uint16_t mesg_id (void) { 
        static int range=0; /* indicates that no permutation is generated yet */ 
        static int index; 
 
        if ( !range ) { 
                srandom(time(0));  /* initialize random number generator seed */ 
                range=1;  /* choose the lower range first */ 
                make_random_permutation(LOW_START); 
                index=0;  /* start from the first element */ 
        } 
        if ( index == NUM_USE ) { /* if the pool is exhasuted */ 
                if ( range == 1 ) { 
                        range=2; /* choose the higher range */ 
                        make_random_permutation(HIGH_START); 
                } 
                else { 
                        range=1; /* choose the lower range */ 
                        make_random_permutation(LOW_START); 
                } 
                index=0; 
        } 
 if (T.debug > 4) 
  syslog (LOG_DEBUG, "mesg_id() = %d", permutation[index]); 
        return permutation[index++]; 
} 
Figure 2.  The modifications made to the ne_mesg.c source file. 
BIND is able to operate as a recursor, but to make the per-
formance of BIND and TOTD comparable, BIND was set 
as a forwarder. It was done by the following additional 
settings in the named.conf file: 
forwarders { 192.168.100.105; }; 
forward only; 
The Interpretation of the Tables with the Results 
Even though the graphical representation may ease the 
comparison of the results in many cases, now we preferred 
the table format because of the following reasons: 
 The maximum value of the response time of the un-
modified TOTD was more than one order of magni-
tude higher than that of the others thus a comparison 
chart would be ill looking. 
 There were many types of characteristics measured 
thus tables were found more efficient than using dif-
ferent diagrams for every types of values. 
For the synoptic view and easy comparison of the results, 
the four tables were put on the same page. 
Each table is to be interpreted as follows. The first row 
shows the number of the clients. (The offered load was 
proportional with the number of the clients.) Rows 2, 3 and 
4 show the maximum value, the average and the standard 
deviation of the execution time of one experiment, respec-
tively. An experiment is an execution of the dns-st-c.sh 
script, which one executes the “host –t AAAA” command 
256 times using different DNS names to eliminate the ef-
fect of caching. And this script was also executed 256 
times by each client that took part in the measurement. 
Rows 5 and 6 show the average and the standard deviation 
of the CPU utilization of the PIII test computer running the 
DNS64 service. Row 7 shows the memory consumption of 
the DNS64 service. Note that this value could be measured 
with high uncertainty because it was measured by the 
change of the free memory on the test computer. Row 8 
shows the number of requests processed per seconds.  
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TABLE I.  PERFORMANCE OF THE UNMODIFIED TOTD 1.5 
Number of clients 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Exec. time of 256 
host –t AAAA 
commands (s) 
max 0.540 0.640 0.840 117.800 17.070 83.370 25.630 62.740 50.080 31.480 
average 0.524 0.588 0.770 1.879 1.296 1.862 1.857 2.290 2.474 2.673 
std. dev. 0.007 0.021 0.041 9.096 0.932 4.689 1.419 3.594 2.818 1.634 
CPU utilization (%) 
average 22.33 57.89 92.02 50.94 95.29 83.49 94.87 87.97 92.18 96.06 
std. dev. 4.24 3.25 2.43 48.27 20.33 36.69 21.50 32.00 26.38 19.06 
Memory consumption (kB) 892 852 964 1624 1372 1624 1156 1724 1780 1992 
Performance (request/s) 488 870 997 545 988 825 965 894 931 958 
 
TABLE II.  PERFORMANCE OF TOTD 1.5 WITH SEQUENTIAL TRANSACTION IDS 
Number of clients 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Exec. time of 256 
host –t AAAA 
commands (s) 
max 0.530 0.630 0.830 1.060 1.330 1.600 1.830 7.000 7.180 7.460 
average 0.518 0.595 0.759 1.002 1.239 1.498 1.762 2.055 2.268 2.535 
std. dev. 0.007 0.015 0.039 0.042 0.060 0.075 0.068 0.160 0.152 0.142 
CPU utilization (%) 
average 18.94 59.29 90.99 99.22 99.91 99.99 99.99 99.99 100.00 100.00 
std. dev. 4.14 3.96 2.32 0.76 0.30 0.13 0.10 0.13 0.04 0.00 
Memory consumption (kB) 808 944 1076 1188 1232 1484 1556 1752 1780 1768 
Performance (request/s) 494 860 1011 1022 1033 1026 1017 997 1016 1010 
 
TABLE III.  PERFORMANCE OF THE TOTD 1.5 WITH PSEUDORANDOM TRANSACTION IDS 
Number of clients 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Exec. time of 256 
host –t AAAA 
commands (s) 
max 0.540 0.660 0.900 1.090 1.340 1.640 1.890 2.090 7.230 2.710 
average 0.520 0.594 0.760 1.017 1.253 1.536 1.812 2.029 2.279 2.574 
std. dev. 0.007 0.021 0.041 0.041 0.060 0.078 0.087 0.053 0.178 0.081 
CPU utilization (%) 
average 20.81 59.49 91.25 98.86 99.89 99.98 100.00 100.00 99.95 100.00 
std. dev. 3.81 2.47 2.20 1.00 0.32 0.14 0.05 0.00 0.72 0.00 
Memory consumption (kB) 808 1004 1116 1300 1232 1540 1724 1788 1892 1992 
Performance (request/s) 492 862 1009 1007 1022 1000 989 1009 1011 995 
 
TABLE IV.  PERFORMANCE OF BIND AS A FORWARDER 
Number of clients 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Exec. time of 256 
host –t AAAA 
commands (s) 
max 2.820 1.070 1.690 2.360 2.880 3.480 3.960 4.690 5.220 5.830 
average 0.831 1.041 1.588 2.246 2.785 3.390 3.839 4.550 5.086 5.719 
std. dev. 0.125 0.010 0.047 0.060 0.065 0.049 0.101 0.097 0.095 0.086 
CPU utilization (%) 
average 58.27 98.85 99.94 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
std. dev. 5.30 0.81 0.24 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Memory consumption (kB) 24348 48528 53624 51312 53132 51336 52876 50888 51420 50384 
Performance (request/s) 308 492 484 456 460 453 467 450 453 448 
 
 
Performance Results of the Original TOTD 
The results of the unmodified TOTD 1.5 are shown in table 
I. The maximum values of the execution time fluctuate in a 
huge range and show randomness. The average execution 
time grows with the load, except for the experiments with 
four clients, which was an “unlucky” case – see the maxi-
mum value of the execution time (117.8s), the low average 
CPU utilization (50.94%) and low performance (545 re-
quests per seconds). This is why it was so important to find 
the bug in TOTD. 
Performance Results of TOTD with a Bugfix 
Table II shows the performance of TOTD with the quick 
bugfix that made the transaction IDs truly sequential by 
eliminating the hazardous re-randomization. Even though 
TOTD was put under very serious overload, it proved to be 
stable. The CPU was practically fully utilized at four cli-
ents (99.22%) and as the load was increased, TOTD did not 
collapse but the average response time increased only pro-
portionally with the load. The memory consumption was 
also very low and showed only a very little growth in the 
function of the load. The number of requests processed per 
second approximated its maximum value at 3 clients and 
could not significantly increase because of the lack of free 
CPU capacity but it did not show significant decrease even 
in very serious overload situations thus TOTD complied 
with the graceful degradation principles [17]. 
Performance Results of TOTD with Enhanced Security 
Table III shows the performance of TOTD with pseu-
dorandom transaction IDs. The results are really good 
news: TOTD shows no visible decrease of the performance 
compared to the previous case: the graph displaying the 
average response time of this version of TOTD is hiding 
the graph of the previous version in Fig. 3. Therefore we 
recommend the application of this version of TOTD be-
cause the performance price of the increased security is 
marginal. 
Performance Results of BIND as a Forwarder 
Table IV shows the performance of BIND which was set 
up as a forwarder too (for fair comparison). We can lay 
down that BIND is also stable. Its memory consumption is 
significantly higher than that of TOTD. It is probably 
caused by caching. The bad news for BIND is its higher 
CPU time consumption. It uses much more computing 
power (58.27%) than TOTD with pseudorandom transac-
tion IDs (20.81%) even under the load of one client. BIND 
reaches its maximum performance (492 requests per se-
cond) at two clients.  Under serious overload (three or more 
clients), TOTD with pseudorandom transaction ID could 
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process twice as many requests as BIND providing the half 
of the average response time of BIND. Thus TOTD with 
pseudorandom transaction IDs proved to be a good alterna-
tive of BIND. 
Modification of the source code of TOTD 
Our security enhancement patch for the ne_mesg.c file has 
been included into the source code of TOTD 1.5.3 [9]. 
7. CONCLUSIONS 
A testbed was set up and the promising TOTD DNS64 
server was tested extensively. The bug was found in its 
sequential transaction ID generation function and it was 
eliminated.  
Because of its use of sequential transaction IDs, TOTD was 
found to be vulnerable to cache poisoning using the trans-
action ID prediction attack. This vulnerability was patched 
by a very computation efficient solution using random 
permutations and alternating ranges. The performance price 
of the increased security was found to be practically invisi-
ble. Therefore we recommend the application of this ver-
sion of TOTD. 
Under serious overload conditions, TOTD with our pseu-
dorandom transaction ID generation could process twice as 
many requests than BIND providing 50% less average 
response time than BIND. 
We conclude that TOTD with our pseudorandom transac-
tion ID generation patch is a good candidate to be a number 
one DNS64 server solution for the transition period of the 
upcoming IPv6 deployment. 
Our pseudorandom transaction ID generation patch has 
been included into the 1.5.3 version of the source code of 
TOTD on GitHub. 
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